Below are the 8 most recent journal entries recorded in elena_p's LiveJournal:

Saturday, April 17th, 2004
4:22 pm	Gampopa's vision and Sapen's orthodoxy, speaking different language, or weighing the doctrines? I’ve been meaning to write this earlier but haven’t had time, but now here are some thoughts on Gampopa’s Great Seal and Sakya Pandita’s critique of him. Jakson’s article on Sapen’s criticism of Gampopa: There seems to be (p.2) three kinds of options of Gampopa’s giving the instructions on the Great Seal: 1. (not) as secret Vajrayana precepts in connection with initiation and special yogic practices 2. as a doctrine going beyond Sutra and Tantra 3. Sutra based Great Seal This actually leaves only 2: Sutra based and beyond. It seems assumed though that he also gave it as a tantric instructions, thus making it 3 still. To me it appears, that the whole thing is about a larger question of whether, in sutra and tantra, there is one and the same, or different kinds of realizations? Gampopas classification of teachings (p.33) is not hierarchical but relative, and may reflect the inherent hierarchy of capacities of persons rather than of teachings (?) Gampopa tries to use all kinds of doxographical categories in explaining his own teachings? (p.36 where there is a list of 5 categories or types of Buddhists; and also note 84: nga la cho yod/ nga ci bsgom khyed cad la cha med). It also provides a real basis for the emphasis on teacher-student relationship. In Jackson’s description of Sapen’s view on this (p.102) there seems to be no real emphasis on the guru/disciple relationship. No faith or guru devotion in the two types of criteria used for authentication of teachings (reasoning and scriptures) is emphasized. But in reasoning itself, one type of reasoning is based on faith. (In the second chapter of the Compendium on Valid Cognition I think). This, one might argue, gives way for the emphasis on experience rather than on scripture, etc. in authenticating of one’s teachings, exactly what Gampopa seems to be doing (?) In general, Gampopa seems to favor the non-verbal (meaning, non scholastic learning?) transmission (p.39). Also, p.46-47, from where I think one might draw this connection: metaphor-> meaning->experience And this is actually non-contradictory with the tantric initiation, which is also quite non-verbal (?). The accessibility via tantric initiation, the arrangements of the teachings, tantra being the highest of all, this is the issue. Not doing it in this tantric way, is what Gampopa is criticized for, right? But again, if he (Gampopa) thinks that the experience can be attained without the initiation, then again, the experience is emphasized and thus it is implied that the experience is one and the same in sutra and tantra, OR it may be that this experience is the one that this particular person is to get at this point? (I think that this is what Gampopa is actually doing rather than trying to say that the experience is one and the same for sutra and tantra). Sapen seems to not see this, I think, and his orthodoxy is quite rigid and perhaps this rigid-ness is due to his institutional and hierarchical view of the teachings in general. This shows again the general tension that is transparent in Jackson’s article between the experience vs. general knowledge (or intellectual knowledge) (see, for example p.35). This again, might have something to do with the larger question of validation of experience and authentication of teachings. His own (Sapen’s) seems to be based only on 2 (traditional) factors: reasoning and scriptural authority. Gampopa’s, on the other hand, seems to be mainly based on experience. (???) I actually couldn’t help noticing that one of Gampopa’s doxographies that Jackson lists is very similar to one used by Namkhai Norbu in his present day teachings of Dzogchen: 1. Sutra being the vehicle of elimination 2. Tantra being the vehicle of transformation 3. Dzogchen being the vehicle of perfection I guess it goes all the way back and has been used before by the earlier Great Perfection and Great Seal proponents. Although it seem to be tied with the institutional vs. non-institutional practices, for some reason I don’t think that’s all that there is to it. Anyway, I wonder what you (anyone) think in relation to this. (Comment on this)
Tuesday, March 30th, 2004
2:59 am	late thoughts and visions Notes to March 30th. Kapstein”s chapter 6 of the Tibetan Assimilation of Buddhism: (some of my crazy thoughts, beware, proceed with caution and don’t get angry, it’s useless) I couldn’t help noticing that the nature of Mipham’s dream and realization that Kaptein mentions is visual, although it has to do with a strictly philosophical matter and text - Exposition of Valid Cognition: Mipham has a vision of two parts of the text apart, then combined, turned into a sword, with which he cuts through all things that may be known, and as the result of this, is able to understand every WORD in the Exposition of Valid Cognition. (p.87) What this might mean in my interpretation is that the understanding of this text is explained in metaphorical terms OR the understanding itself IS essentially metaphorical, not textual, i.e. scholastic (?). There is no combining of the opposites, it’s cutting through with the combination of these, not merely what Kapstein says about the having perfectly balanced two-edged sword (?). It’s the action of “metaphorical” application, so to speak, and the vision itself that is the most important thing here, it seems. Also, continuing on the same page (second pr from bottom) when he says that the “distinction between visionary and scholastic approaches to the interpretation of Buddhist teaching was… by no means an impermeable one, and to recognize this is one of the ways in which our conception of Tibetan scholasticism needs to become more nuanced,” one can not only agree with this but go even further and indicate that the ultimate validation of reasoning and interpretation may not have been the skill in quoting the scriptures, refuting and proving, or balancing these two, but mainly having visions and getting affirmation from the deities. Thus one can again polemitize and “problematize” this by bringing up many examples that we have found in the BA of visions, lineages transmitted directly from deities, teachers appearing and encouraging the students to write, etc. etc. So, then one might say (arguably) that the distinction that Kapstein has drown (p.85) in the beginning of this chapter and tried to subsume under the term “creative dialogue” may have not been really existent (?). I know this is going a bit too far, but doesn’t the Tibetan Buddhist reasoning and the exposition on valid cognition actually accept the reason based on faith as one of the ultimate tools of investigation? This alone could totally bridge the distinction between the “contemplative and scholarly orientations, tantric and nontantric,” and reiterate their common predicate: faith in the Buddha, his teaching and his various manifestations (deities, gurus, etc.), thus, again referring to the validation of the text/meaning by vision, one can argue that the “metaphorical”(visionary), not scholastic “orientations” “appear” to prevail (?). Because the “scholastic orientations” of any one scholar/practitioner at the time may have been still “in service” of proving various aspects of what was probably generally commonly accepted among them all – Buddha’s supreme intelligence, his compassionate intention and skillful means (?), then this is not an unusual thing to find that visions and metaphors become the final say in debate and authentication of one’s scholastic learning (???). It may seem that I’m saying what Kapstein is saying (am I?), but I’m actually just trying to improvise on my notice of visions and cut through. Current Mood: awake Current Music: birds outside!!! I wonder if there was a cat!? (Comment on this)
Monday, March 22nd, 2004
9:57 pm	thinking about books and art, about appreciation in general and the readings I have been avoiding blogging for quite some time now, for various good reasons, though. But I feel compelled to urge all who might stumble upon this blog: Eternal sunshine of a spotless mind is a Great movie, go see it. On another note, Since I’m writing this just after Kirtis Schaeffer’s talk on Book culture in Tibet, I couldn’t help noticing a strange inversion between what we’ve been reading for our tomorrow’s class and the talk’s metaphor. If you remember he started with saying that a book is the carefully crafted work of art. Therefore, has an economic as well as symbolic value. He clearly drew some analogy between the book and the work of art, using the usual tension that the art historians are talking about for years: form vs. content, style vs. composition/structure, etc. Which is somewhat in parallel and concomitant with the interpretation of artworks as expressions of language: what vs. how, etc. This is the stuff that the literary theorists were talking about and that the historians are picking up now and contesting, as we’ve learned from the readings for tomorrow’s class. Right? Kirtis’ talk seems to be the inversion of this approach, or the coming around, if you see what I mean. It may also be in line with the material culture interpretations of art and books, don’t you agree? But if one is going to look at books in their own context and in the context of the literature about them and about their production, then it seems that stressing this old opposition that has been used and abused doesn’t seem quite fruitful. On another hand, it’s actually totally valid to view some of these books as real works of art, and the culture of book making has been long regarded as the art-making in many other countries, not only in India, Nepal, but in Japan, China, Europe, etc. The first real novel was written in Japan in early 11th century, illustrated in early 12th and may be actually the prototype of the Japanese picture-books, which then developed into comic book culture, etc. So, what I’m getting at is the question of what defines the so-called book culture? The appreciation of books for their economic value or there are other aspects of actual appraisal/appreciation of books that are not so clearly cut and combine symbolic with stylistic, form and content, text and image, script and expensive paper, etc. He did mention that if the book doesn’t look impressive, then its impact is not that affective. This is exactly from the art historical view of looking at things. The glance, the scan and view of the thing is just like receiving a visual impact from an artwork. (This is I guess another example of Kirtis’ using art historical metaphor, although perhaps unintentionally, as this was a quote from Goram panchen ?). Also, I’m not sure that style and artifice could be counted as the elements constituting the symbolic value. This rather reflects a viewer’s response to an artwork based on its purely external qualities (form) - the connoisseurship, when an informed viewer understands that this particular form has certain exceptional qualities, etc. And this is actually reading into, i.e. not an initial response, tha one which leads to growing of faith and so on. This informed appreciation is pre-determined in a way by the viewer’s acculturation and this quote may reflect Goram panchen’c personal taste, which was probably uncommon and quite cultivated. (?) This in turn brings another question about the book culture: what was an average person’s book appreciation like? What one liked in such a book? Paper, calligraphy, pictures, stories and anecdotes, secret precepts, notes of his/her teacher, etc. Probably, it’s hard to find any evidence of this sorts of things. Anyway, I didn’t think this blog would turn out to be so lengthy. Sorry. Speaking of book appreciation, did you hear that UVA is hosting A VISIT WITH MICHAEL ONDAATJE (!!!???) (“Booker Prize-winning author of The English Patient and Anil's Ghost”) this Saturday, March 27th, at 4:00 PM at UVa Newcomb Hall Ballroom. All for now, Toodle. Current Mood: amused (Comment on this)
Tuesday, February 24th, 2004
12:17 pm	clans, lineages, politics and economics? Reading the BA and Davidson’s chapters for this week I couldn’t help noticing few things in relation to lineages, clans and money. First of all, there are family lineages with the tradition passed down from father to son, uncle to nephew, etc.; and there are teacher-disciple lineages with no familial or even clan affiliation. Davidson mentions that these “two seldom coincided”(326). Perhaps it would be interesting to look into the power politics and economics of this. Since the institutions and their related traditions represented the teachings of a de facto feudal lord, (at least this is true about the most of the translators, according to Davidson), and thus were strongly clan based, it is interesting how the inter-clan and, more generally, scenarios of giving the teachings to the outsiders were handled and regulated. It seems that material goods, gold, real estate, etc. offerings are common, and especially necessary for those disciples who are outsiders. Why and where does this come from? Is it an Indian thing? How this affected the consolidation etc. of the teacher’s and the disciple’s lineages? In case of Drokmi and his renown avariciousness: he had no clan affiliation whatsoever, and perhaps needed other sources of establishing his influences besides his translating work. A kind of acquiring capital thing. He also, perhaps, was imitating the behavior of known to him Indian and Nepalese teachers. The Tibetan authors mockery of Gayadhara along with Davidson’s ascribing his questionable behavior to his background, is not quite convincing if looked at in a different light, and in general seems not very nice. This time, 11th century, especially it’s second half, seems the time when Indians were in general thinking of Tibet as a source of influence and money, I think. Perhaps, Gayadhara is just one of the examples of such expectations. The BA is full of lists of money that were given to teachers as offerings for teachings, to Indians, and Tibetans. Where does this come from? (Comment on this)
Sunday, February 22nd, 2004
3:14 am	clans and their mythologies etc. (After saturday night things having a bit of light reading): Reading Davidson’s chapter 7 and his discussion on clan mythologies got me thinking: what if it’s possible to compare these various clan mythologies with the royal myth of divine origin and their relations to various deities, as Davidson says that “these myth combine the Buddhist story of kingship… with the Tibetan modes of the descent by some spiritual avenue between the sky and the mountain peaks …” and the pedigrees of these legends are uncertain and they went on growing (pages 354-355). I wonder if it would be possible by such a mutual comparison of the legends and their specific affiliation with particular Buddhist divinities to figure out the relative temporal periods when these legends were “produced” and practices that were “in fashion,” or/and more practical reasons behind these choices, etc.? I wonder when clans began to associate themselves with particular divinities and was this association always connected with a lineage transmission? Current Mood: thirsty (Comment on this)
Tuesday, February 17th, 2004
7:49 pm	still thinking about terma, but now about Bon as well. In addition to this, It seems that Bon termas are different from the Nyingma termas in this sense, as they are not as revelatory/mythical (with some exceptions) and not necessarily employ the same scenario. I may be wrong, because Dan Martin is talking about them all in a common generalized way as having been “foreshadowed by certain sutras”(Martin (2001): 21). He actually stresses the fact of the actual concealment and subsequent recovery of a sutra rather than the literary/narrative scenario of predestined revelation and the unfolding of the event as described in the text and reenactment of it (23-24). Could it be that the later Bon termas were adjusted to the Buddhist format and became also revelatory, like the example that Martin uses? On another note, I really liked his pointing out the “archaeological” aspect of the terma discoveries, his notice of the “acknowledgment of the authority of the artifact.” Although he seems to look to the specifically Buddhist factors in explaining this phenomenon (aspiration prayers and notion of gradual decline, etc.) I couldn’t help thinking of the authority of the artifact that is most strongly exemplified in Japan. The magatama jewels of the pre-Buddhist Japan, which became imperial symbols, resonate for me with the notion of ratna and norbu, which are also authoritative emblems/symbols in India and Tibet, and I guess China as well. (?) The whole thing of these items’ association with kingship may not be just a desperate way of legitimazing once’s tradition as a reaction to persecution, etc. but rather an obvious thing to do (for the people who are culturally already kind of “predisposed” to such expressions of authority) in defining and making themselves in relation to the other cultural norm? Then this kind of predisposes the original pre-Buddhist norm that existed in Tibet and I’m confused. I also couldn’t help thinking of Japan’s Shinto tradition, which defined itself in relation to the introduction of Buddhism and Confucianism from the continent, but it doesn’t really mean that it didn’t exist before. Some elements of Shinto were quite prominent and there are tons of archaeological data to support this. Shinto as it is known now did come to existence in relation to Buddhist tradition and because of the conscious effort to define itself. I know it’s not fair to try such sweeping comparisons, and in fact Martin remarks on R. Stein’s statement about comparing Bon and Taoism (211, note 1), but it still might be useful to look for the general strategies in such things as defining own tradition, etc. Maybe this is like Martin says, the Nyingmapas stole this terma phenomenon from the Bonpos and, again to quote Martin: “tranform[ed] current visions of the past providing new etymologies for cultural items of contemporary importance”(20). I liked his book but it made me even more confused about the whole thing. I guess I’m still under the influence of an emic perspective that I’ve got exposed to earlier. Current Mood: lazy (Comment on this)
Saturday, February 14th, 2004
2:07 pm	thinking about bka'ma and terma Continuing thinking in the vain of our discussion on terma and bka’ma literature (apart from regarding these two categories as the tactics of the Nyingmapa to assert their own authority and legitimacy of the teaching). It seems that the narrating scenario and the literary structure of both (bka’ma and terma) is modeled upon the standard sutra-like format. With notions of timelessness and interrelating time it appears to be cyclical, which is seen to a greater degree in classical tantras, which stems from the STTSG’s enlightenment and then subjugation narratives. The event of enlightenement and victory over / subjugation of Mara and then Mahesvara is told as if this was meant to happen as this was the way it should happen and always happens. The Buddha had established the karmic connection in his past to do so, etc. (like in the mdo dgong ‘dus – the event is a recurring event which is reenacted upon a certain circumstance, a moment, like the appearance of such an ignorant being like Rudra, etc. ) In terma narratives what happens to the revealer is “linked to the moment in the past” and “is a fulfillment of a karmic destiny established in past life,”(Gyatso(1993):109) a scenario transparent in the Nyingma tantras. In this way, it seems to represent a unified or standard way of authenticating the text, tradition, etc. despite the obvious differences between the bka’ma and terma traditions). This, in turn, invites all sorts of interpretations related to authenticity, legitimacy, etc. If looked at from the perspective of the known literary format, which is the one that the Tibetans were introduced to with the Buddhist literature, it seems almost formulaic that they adhered to the only known way of constructing their authentic authoritative narrative, doesn’t it? Current Mood: contemplative (Comment on this)
Monday, January 26th, 2004
10:45 pm	Monastics and Maitreya This is just some of my private thoughts, but if anyone glances at this and has a comment or a reference, please write away. What’s up with Maitreya? Davidson’s refers to mkas pa’i dga’ ston that “quotes” Khuton’s Great Chronicle about the so-called in between groups who were neither aristocratic, nor rustic: “arhats with knots” who were not really monastics. They “set up two Jowo statues in religious meetings dedicated to Maitreya and made offerings…They began to serve as chaplains for the people.” (Davidson: 90). Doesn’t it seem very similar to the things we’ve read about Chinese Buddhism outside of the capital? In BA (book 15) Kashmirian mahapandita Sakyasribhadra, who is the main authority in reestablishing, it seems, the new monastic Buddhist transmissions, puts in a lot of effort to erect and consecrate Maitreya statue. (Roerich 1070). But Maitreya, why particularly this deity not the other? Wouldn’t this imply persistence of a strong monastic tradition? (immediately following) There is also some mentioning of the Perfection of Insight recitations, which are still done in almost the same manner and also by monks or by ngagpas and gomchens. So, I guess what I’m asking is: 1) it seems that the so-called new monasticism didn’t really change how things were done ritually, or did it? 2) Is there a particular connection between Maitreya and monastic/institutionalized Buddhism? 3) In general, what’s going on? Are they going back to the sutras and rejecting tantras? Is Manjusrinamasangiti, one of the earlier tantras, still one of the most popular tantras along with the Perfection of Insight? Current Mood: curious (1 Comment |Comment on this)